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Abstract
Can peer-to-peer (P2P) marketplaces benefit traditional supply chains when con-
sumers may experience valuation risk? P2P marketplaces can mitigate consumers’ risk
by allowing them to trade mismatched goods; yet, they also impose a threat to retail-
ers and their suppliers as they compete over consumers. Further, do profit-maximizing
marketplaces always extract the entire consumer surplus from the online trades?
Our two-period model highlights the effects introduced by P2P marketplaces while
accounting for the platform’s pricing decisions. We prove that with low product unit
cost, the P2P marketplace sets its transaction fee to the market clearing price, thereby
extracting all of the seller surplus. In this range of product unit cost, the supply chain
partners are worse off due to the emergence of a P2P marketplace. However, when
the unit cost is high, the platform sets its transaction fee to be less than the market
clearing price, intentionally leaving money on the table, as a mechanism to stimulate
first period demand for new goods in expectation for some of them to be traded later, in
the second period, via the marketplace. It is not until the surplus left with the sellers is
sufficiently high that the supply chain partners manage to extract some of this surplus,
ultimately making them better off due to a P2P marketplace. We further analyze the
impact of a P2P marketplace on consumer surplus and social welfare. In addition, we
consider model variants accounting for a frictionless platform and consumer strategic
waiting.
Keywords: consumers’ valuation risk, P2P marketplace, retailing strategy, backward
induction. History: Received: August, 2014; Accepted: February, 2016 by Haresh
Gurnani, after 3 revisions.
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1 Introduction
Buyer uncertainty can unfold in a variety of ways. Consumers may possess uncertainty
regarding their consumption state—namely how many units they require and/or how often
they use the product—the type of product they want to consume (Fay and Xie, 2010), or
the fit of the good for their needs (e.g., as firms may intentionally limit the amount of
information released to consumers (Chu and Zhang, 2011)). In addition, when shopping,
consumers may make quick purchasing decisions only to later realize that the purchased
product has limited or no value to them. This valuation uncertainty (as in Prasad et al.,
2011) exposes consumers to risky decision making and, accordingly, their willingness to pay
is diminished (Grewal et al., 1994; Teo and Yeong, 2003). Thus, valuation uncertainty can
inhibit potential consumers from purchasing, and hence harm the supply chain partners—the
retailers and their immediate suppliers. Returning unwanted goods is not always an option.
For instance, numerous stores do not accept returns (apparel, consumer electronics) simply
because a customer did not like it, arguing that the experience at the store should suffice to
determine fit1.
Although in other cases consumers can return unwanted goods, they usually face a num-
ber of hurdles, such as (excessive) restocking fees2, non-refundable fees (e.g., activation fees
for mobile phones), long waiting times (Tuttle, 2013) (which exacerbates time spent on trav-
eling back to the store or to the post office), missing receipts3, and conditions imposed by
stores for the returned goods to be in like-new condition (AT&T, for instance, also demands
the software accompanying a mobile device to be in unopened shape) or even unopened
(for example computer components, drones, headphones or major appliances at BestBuy
Canada)—a condition that is not always trivial to satisfy, especially if product fit is known
1See, e.g., http://www.china-mike.com/china-travel-tips/shopping-guide/, accessed 11/11/2015.
2A research stream has evolved to address optimal restocking fees which can control consumer returns
and segment the market, and which may change based on supply chain as well as competitive considerations
(see, for example, Shulman et al., 2009, 2010, 2011).
3A recent survey in the UK revealed that “around half of those who were refused a refund were told it was
because they didn’t have the receipt” and a little over 70% of those surveyed experienced problems getting
an instore refund (Lezemore, 2010).
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only through experience. Importantly, for many goods and many consumers, the trial pe-
riod may not suffice to conclude whether they would like to keep the good or not. These
reasons probably explain the vast amount of unwanted goods that find their way to peer-to-
peer (P2P) platforms, such as Craigslist, eBay, Kijiji, and more recently FaceBay, which are
marketplaces in which consumers sell goods directly to one another (Wright, 2014).4
We further validate our qualitative observations above via a survey conducted on Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk platform. In the survey we asked 113 self-selected participants in the
USA about how they use online platforms to alleviate their valuation uncertainty. Our survey
reveals that 33% of all participants have sold a product online only because it did not meet
their expectations. Of those individuals, 92% stated that knowing that they may sell the
product online alleviated their uncertainty regarding the product meeting their expectations.
This survey further supports our qualitative observations. The complete survey description
and results are provided in the Online Supplements that accompanies this manuscript.
Do these P2P platforms hurt retailers in the same fashion that online retailing was blamed
in stealing market share away from brick-and-mortar stores (Bhatnagar, 2006)? Indeed, a
McKinsey report (MacKenzie et al., 2013) pointed out that companies such as “Craigslist,
eBay, and Etsy (home to almost a million small businesses) are creating [P2P] marketplaces
. . . [that] are eating into traditional demand for retail goods.” However, this view completely
ignores the potential benefit for traditional retailing. Platforms argue that “they can help
retailers because shoppers are more willing to spend if they know they can easily resale
items later” (AP, 2014). Evidently, consumers purchase goods while keeping in mind the
resale value they can fetch through online P2P platforms (AP, 2014). This was confirmed
in our survey, however we consider platforms alleviating mismatch uncertainty more so than
recouping costs.
While independent P2P platforms, which are generally profit-maximizing entities, are
4A systematic search on Kijiji.ca, an online frictionless P2P platform similar to Craigslist, found 4-8% of
listings, category dependent, are “brand new in the box” (or “brand new with tags” for apparel) as described
by the seller. This number increased to 10-20% if we only considered “brand new” items.
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not established to hurt or support traditional supply chains per se, in this manuscript we
ask whether the latter are better off, or worse off, due to the emergence of the former. On
the one hand, supply chain partners can leverage the advantage of the P2P marketplaces to
reduce the risk faced by consumers and increase their sales. On the other hand, the supply
chain partners need to compete with the P2P platforms who offer used goods that eats into
their profits.5 Furthermore, profit-maximizing platforms may have the incentive to set the
transaction fee equal to the selling price of the goods traded on the platform (see, Mantin
et al. (2014)). By doing so, all surplus gained could be extracted by the platform, neutralizing
all benefits to the supply chain partners.
Hence, in this manuscript we focus our discussion on the friction between traditional
retailing and P2P platforms by addressing the two opposing forces brought on by P2P
platforms. It is this perspective that highlights our contribution, as to the best of our
knowledge, this manuscript is the only one to explore the trade-off between buyer valuation
uncertainty and P2P platforms. In particular we address a number of important research
questions: Would the platform always extract all benefits to sellers, and if not, why? Can,
and under what conditions, P2P marketplaces benefit or harm supply chain partners in
the presence of consumers’ valuation uncertainty? Additionally, can consumers receive any
benefits from P2P marketplaces, or are these benefits neutralized by the operators of these
marketplaces and/or supply chain partners? Lastly, does a P2P marketplace induce a net
social welfare gain? Namely, a P2P marketplace is more likely to emerge if it can generate
positive profit. Is this profit merely a redistribution of wealth or generation of new welfare?
To study a P2P marketplace’s pricing decision and the implications of its emergence on
the supply chain partners, consumers, and social welfare, we consider, in this paper, a two-
period setting in which a single retailer purchases a quantity of a single product from a single
supplier and then sells to consumers. The consumers are forward-looking, as they take into
consideration the possibility that the purchased product will not match their expectations
5Marketplaces are usually operated by a platform and we use the terms P2P marketplace and P2P
platform interchangeably throughout this paper.
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after purchase. In each of the periods, the supplier sets the wholesale prices and then the
retailer places his order quantity, which corresponds to the selling price. Once a platform is
established, it allows consumers to salvage the mismatched products by selling them in the
second period. The profit-maximizing platform generates revenue by charging consumers a
fixed transaction fee, which is set ahead of any actions taken by the supply chain partners.
Given the transaction fee set by the platform, the supply chain partners optimize their
decisions to maximize their respective profits.6
The analysis gives rise to several important insights. Our first finding is that the profit
maximizing platform does not always extract all surplus form the consumers who sell their
unwanted goods via the platform. While existing literature has either assumed an exogenous
transaction fee or simply that the platform is a fringe and hence extracts all surplus from
the marketplace sellers, we endogenize this decision made by the platform operator. Indeed,
when the unit cost of the product is sufficiently low, the platform behaves as in Mantin
et al. (2014) and extracts all surplus. However, when the unit cost is high, then the platform
sets the transaction fee to be lower than the market clearing price. The incentive of the
platform operator in this case is clear: the high unit cost, which is then reflected by a high
selling price, inflicts a high loss to consumers when a mismatch occurs. To relieve consumers
and stimulate first period demand, in expectation of increased platform traffic in the second
period, the platform operator commits to a transaction fee that leaves sellers with some
surplus.7
Second, when a profit-maximizing P2P platform is involved, both supply chain partners
will be better off if the product’s unit cost is sufficiently high and both will be worse off
otherwise (we also note that the minimum unit cost that makes the supply chain partners
better off is higher than the minimum unit cost that makes consumers better off). The
intuition behind this is that a P2P platform may stimulate first period demand by eliminating
6In the Online Supplement we demonstrate that a percentage fee yields qualitatively similar insights.
7To implement the fee structure emerging from our analysis, the platform operator can, for example, set
a fee that changes with the product category. Thus, the insights behind our results can help explaining
Amazon’s Marketplace transaction fee structure, which is open to individual sellers.
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consumers’ valuation uncertainty and induce the supply chain partners to increase the price of
new products, however, the platform also imposes competition that impairs the supply chain
partners’ second period profit. When the product’s unit cost is low, the ratio of transaction
fee to mismatched goods selling price is high, which means the platform extracts all or most
of the surplus form its consumers and hence reduces first period demand. As a result, the
supply chain partners will not gain enough to compensate the loss from the competition
brought on by the platform in the second period due to low first period demand.
Third, when the product’s unit cost is sufficiently high, a P2P platform benefits consumers
in two ways: 1) it introduces competition between new and used goods in the second period
and 2) it relieves consumers from their valuation uncertainty as they recoup some of the loss
by selling mismatched products through the platform. Thus, the price of new goods in the
second period is lower and consumers surplus in the first period can be higher while inducing
more consumers to purchase the good, overall making consumers better off. Importantly, we
find that the social welfare can be improved as all parties—the consumers, the marketplace,
and the supply chain partners—may be simultaneously better off. In the alternate case,
when the product’s unit cost is sufficiently low, the platform’s harm outweigh its benefit,
making consumers worse off. In this setting, the upward price pressure on the retailer in the
first period eliminates some consumers from purchasing in the first period—an effect that
outweighs the benefit of additional consumers purchasing from the platform. In this case,
not only consumers are worse off: the upward price pressure on the retailer results in net
loss in profits for the supply chain partners as well.
Fourth, as we also distinguish between a profit-maximizing platform and a frictionless
P2P platform which charges no transaction fee for online trades among consumers, we find
that the frictionless P2P platform further stimulates competition in the second period driven
by the increased demand experienced in the first period. As the frictionless platform gains
no profit from online transactions, the supply chain partners are generally better off unless
the mismatched probability is high and the unit cost is low, and consumers are always better
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off compared to the benchmark scenario. All agents are never worse off and mostly better
off compared to the profit-maximizing platform scenario.
Last, the analysis of the setting where consumers exhibit strategic waiting—those who ar-
rive in the first period may delay their purchase of a new good to the second period—suggests
that the retailer can still be better off due to the presence of a platform. Interestingly, the
platform can further benefit the retailer when the probability of a mismatch is relatively
high. This occurs as the platform, which provides consumers with a channel to trade their
mismatched goods, allows the retailer to inter-temporally segment the consumers who arrive
in the first period, by committing, in such a setting, to increase the price over time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of related
literature. Section 3 describes the model framework. The benchmark scenario and the
scenario that accounts for the presence of a profit-maximizing platform are analyzed in
Section 4. In Section 5, we further discuss the implications of the platform on the supply
chain partners, consumers and social welfare. The scenarios with a frictionless platform and
strategic waiting are analyzed in Section 6. Lastly, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
Several papers have studied the impact of secondary, used goods, markets on the primary,
new goods, markets. For example, Chen et al. (2013) developed a dynamic model where
consumers experience random valuation shocks and goods stochastically perish over time,
and then calibrated the model using automotive sales data revealing a drop of 35% in re-
tailers’ profitability due to secondary used goods trading. Johnson (2011) focused on the
role of the retailers’ choice of product durability in a two-period setting with random redraw
of consumers valuations, in suggesting constellations where secondary markets may increase
a monopolist’s profits. Our paper contributes to this stream by integrating the important
aspect of buyer uncertainty and the corresponding product mismatch consumers face while
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accounting for the presence of a supplier to account for channel coordination considerations.
A related stream of literature considers the impact of various secondary marketplaces on
the supply chain. Shulman and Coughlan (2007), who explicitly account for the role of the
supplier, limit the scope of their study to a retailer-controlled secondary market: the retailer
buys back used goods at a pre-determined price (which is a major lever in controlling the flow
of used goods back to the market) from the consumers and resells them in the second period
alongside new goods, implying that under certain conditions, the retailer effectively operates
a rental market. We differ from this model by capturing both the role of the independent
secondary market where prices are determined endogenously and the valuation uncertainty
that consumers encounter. A similar paper by Ghose et al. (2005) investigate in the impact of
a retailer operated P2P platform on the suppliers. Specifically, they show while a monopoly
supplier might be worse off due to a platform, duopoly suppliers with quality differentiated
goods might be better off. An independent secondary market is studied by Oraiopoulos
et al. (2012), where the market operator purchases used goods from consumers, refurbishes
them and then the consumers who buy these units purchase a license from the OEM. The
OEM, by setting this relicensing fee, can control the secondary market (i.e., it can effectively
shut down this market by charging a high licensing fee). The authors find that the OEM
keeps the secondary market when consumers’ willingness to pay for a refurbished good is
high as the OEM benefits twice: relicensing fee and higher selling price (due to resale value).
In our setting the retailer does not have this luxury of two streams of revenue while the
entrant operates a platform (rather than as a retailer). Hence, our focus is on the effect
of platforms in the absence of the relicensing fee while further accounting for the role of
consumers’ uncertainty.
Closely related to our contribution are the papers by Yin et al. (2010) and Gümüş et al.
(2013). Yin et al. (2010) consider supplier induced product upgrades and the presence
of a secondary used good market (either retailer-controlled and/or P2P platform), where
they find that the supply-chain partners may benefit from the emergence of P2P platforms.
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Gümüş et al. (2013) explore the role of P2P platforms in affecting the supplier’s choice
of return policies offered to the retailer in a two-period setting. The buyback option has
an important role in mediating competition: the retailer returns all unsold goods back to
the supplier to avoid competition with the platform. However, in both papers, consumers
do not face valuation risk and after using the good, all consumers return or resell the good.
Additionally, our manuscript further differentiates from the above contributions as we distin-
guish between platforms that charge a transaction fee from the sellers, with the transaction
fee being endogenously determined in our model, (which are common in practice, such as
eBay) and frictionless platforms (an assumption adopted by most of the above-mentioned
papers). Endogenizing the platform transaction fee generalizes the only result we are aware
of in profit maximizing P2P platforms by Mantin et al. (2014), who assumed the platform
sets the transaction fee to the market clearing price. By contrast, we show that the profit
maximizing platform does not always extract all consumer surplus and characterize the con-
ditions, sufficiently high per-unit product cost, in which the platform extracts only some of
the surplus.
Online P2P platforms have attracted other research questions, such as the empirical
investigation of the role of online deal-forums in influencing the trading prices on P2P plat-
forms (which supports our assumption of a market clearance mechanism) Gopal et al. (2006).
Others have focused on Amazon’s dual-format retailing, such as Mantin et al. (2014) and
the substitution between new and used books offered on Amazon Ghose et al. (2006). More
broadly, a P2P platform can be perceived as a two-sided market. The two-sided market
literature endogenizes the transaction fee, but it is primarily concerned with market par-
ticipation, by controlling access and usage fees. Generally, this literature does not consider
competition between secondary and primary markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2006).
The other aspect of our modelling framework is consumers’ buyer uncertainty, which
then results with a product mismatch. A stream of research explores pricing strategies in
the presence of such risk. Hsiao and Chen (2012) note that quality risk has an impact
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on the retailer’s return policy and pricing strategies. Other papers extend the product
return literature to account for various constellations such as competition and supply chain
considerations (see, e.g., Shulman et al., 2009, 2010, 2011). Gu and Liu (2013) argue that
better matching between consumers and products may hurt the retailer’s profit, in which
case, the retailer cuts its own sales commissions and blocks manufacturer SPIFF (Sales
Person Incentive Funding Formula) programs so as to suppress retail sales assistance provided
by its own personnel. In B2C channels, retailers and consumers face not only product
quality risk, but also valuation uncertainty due to information asymmetry. Given consumers’
uncertainty, Chu and Zhang (2011) show that a retailer can induce consumers into pre-
ordering goods by controlling product information release. Consumers’ valuation uncertainty
plays an important role in their behaviors. Indeed, it is often considered in supply chain
studies; yet, this consideration is rather absent when a P2P platform is present. Our paper
contributes to the literature by highlighting the role of consumers’ valuation uncertainty in
the interaction between a P2P platform and supply chain partners.
3 Modeling Framework
In this section, we describe our model setup and the methods to solve the model. In order,
to capture the inter-temporal interaction within supply chain members and consumers, we
simplify time, by only considering two periods, with pricing, production, and purchase de-
cisions being made in both periods. We first consider a benchmark scenario, where a single
profit-maximizing retailer purchases new durable products from one profit-maximizing sup-
plier and then retails them to consumers in the absence of a platform. We then consider a
scenario, where a profit-maximizing platform is present and competes with the retailer in the
second period by letting consumers trade mismatched goods purchased in the first period.
Later in the manuscript, we also consider the special case of a frictionless platform scenario.
For all scenarios, we consider ex ante equilibrium decisions and assume risk-neutral agents.
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Similar to Yin et al. (2010), a new set of consumers shows up in each period and their
initial valuations v are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Those consumers also face
valuation uncertainty: due to a variety of issues, not entirely modeled in this paper, such as
lack of information, consumers may find the good to be unfit for their purposes. Specifically,
we assume that after some preliminary use, consumers realize their actual valuation for the
good. In practice, consumers may develop expectations about their valuation for the goods
based on, e.g., media attention, commercials, or word-of-mouth. However, they may not
know their true valuation for the good until some preliminary use. This is true for a variety of
products such as some electronic goods, where the user experience can be quite instrumental
in determining whether the consumer would like to own the good or not. Unfortunately,
for many of these goods, it is not possible to return the item after initial use, and thus a
consumer may be left with a negative net utility after realizing their true personal value
of the good. Using the terminology used in Hsiao and Chen (2012), we assume that with
some probability, consumers find the product to be mismatched and hence has no value for
them, and with the complementary probability the good has the full initial valuation, v. We
use αi ∈ {0, 1} to indicate consumer i’s mismatch realization, where αi = 1 implies that
the product is a mismatch and hence the realized valuation of the product is 0, and αi = 0
indicates a match and hence the full valuation v is materialized. We let θ ∈ [0, 1] represent
the probability of consumers having full private valuation, that is, αi = 0. For the purpose
of simplification, we assume consumers are homogeneous with respect to their uncertainty
risk, which means θ is also the expected probability of consumers having a matched product.
Since consumers are risk-neutral and forward looking,8 they purchase the good only if their
expected utility, θv − p, where p denotes the price, is non-negative.
8This notion of consumer forward looking behavior is different than that assumed in dynamic pricing
models. Specifically, consumers are not engaged in the dynamic decision of whether to purchase the good
right now or postpone the decision to a later period (an aspect that is explored later in Section 6.2). In our
model, consumers decide whether to purchase the good right now or not at all. The rational behavior comes
into play by capturing their expectations about the actual valuation for the good and the money they can
recoup in case their valuation risk materializes and they resell the good through the secondary market, if
one is available.
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Throughout the analysis, we use the following notation: Let the first superscript, i,
denote the scenarios and the second superscript, j, denote the players. The first subscript, t,
denotes the periods and the second subscript, r, denotes the types of products. The complete
notation is provided in Table 1.
U itr consumers’ expected utility from buying type r product in period t in scenario i
wiStn wholesale price of new product in period t in scenario i
pijtr selling price of type r product from player j in period t in scenario i
qijtr demand of type r product from player j in period t in scenario i
tiP platform transaction fee in scenario i
Πijt player j’s profit in period t in scenario i
Πij player j’s total profit in scenario i
CSi consumer surplus in scenario i
SW i social welfare in scenario i
Table 1: Some notation: i ∈ {B,P, F}, j ∈ {S,R, P}, t ∈ {1, 2}, r ∈ {n, p}, where
B,P, and F stand for the benchmark, profit-maximizing, and frictionless platform scenarios
respectively; S,R, and P stand for the supplier, retailer, and platform, respectively; n and
p stand for new and platform products, respectively.
The sequence of events in the benchmark setting is depicted in the top row of Figure 1.
In period 1, the supplier sets the wholesale price wBS1n , then the retailer purchases an amount,
qBR1n , of new products from the supplier. This quantity corresponds to a first period’s selling
price pBR1n .
9 We use c to denote the unit cost of acquiring one product for the supplier, and
we assume c < θ. This assumption is necessary to satisfy the supplier’s individual rationality
constraint by guaranteeing positive profit in expectation in all scenarios. After pBR1n has been
announced, consumers buy products based on their expected utility. At the end of period 1,
individual mismatch, αi, is realized and all consumers with mismatched products ((1−θ)qBR1n
in expectation) experience a negative utility, −pBR1n . As discussed previously, we assume that
customers cannot return used goods to the retailer for a refund, instead, in our model the
consumer may only sell their used goods via a P2P platform, if it is available. This is indeed
the case for most electronic goods, and such goods may be seen sold on P2P platforms.
9In our setting, due to the deterministic nature of the model, prices and quantities are equivalent: once
the quantity is determined, the price follows immediately.
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In period 2, a new set of consumers shows up. In our study we are not considering
completely new products, period to period, and as such consumers that have made their
decision in the first period have no reason to reconsider the decision again in the second.
Implicitly, we do not consider strategic waiting by consumers in the main model of our
paper, however we discuss the impact of strategic consumers, those that decide to wait
between period 1 to period 2 in Section 6.2. The supplier sets the new wholesale price wBS2n ,
then the retailer purchases an amount, qBR2n , of new products from the supplier and hence the
second period’s selling price pBR2n is determined. As before, consumers buy products based
on their expected utility.10
Platform 
























 𝛼   
realized 
Figure 1: Timeline of events: events that occur only in the presence of the platform are with
dashed arrows; non-decision events are in italic.
To capture the effect of a P2P platform, which allows used goods from the first period
to be traded in the second period between consumers, on the supply chain partners and the
consumers, we consider a variation to the benchmark scenario. In this augmented scenario,
the retailer sells new products in both periods, while used products are traded through the
10Note that in our setting we maintain the same level of uncertainty about the product fit in both periods
as the demand in the second period stems from a new cohort of consumers. One might consider an alternative
approach where the uncertainty in the second period is alleviated. In the absence of late season uncertainty,
holding everything else fixed, the (expected) consumer surplus may increase. Accordingly, the demand for
the goods increases and we expect both prices in the late season to increase as well. With higher second
period prices, consumers can recoup more of their loss in an event of mismatch, resulting with the retailer
raising the price in the first period as well. This certainly benefits the supply chain partners. Indeed, as
uncertainty is alleviated, the valuation for the good may change: if it increases universally, it further amplifies
the intuitions above, while if it decreases universally, then it moderates, or even reverse, the intuitions above.
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platform only in the second period. Used goods sold on the platform are all mismatched
goods from the first period that consumers were not able to return to the retailer.
The Stackelberg game sequence of events in the presence of a platform, which is shown
in Figure 1, is as follows: Following Mantin et al. (2014), in the first stage, the platform
commits to a fixed transaction fee to charge consumers for selling through the platform; a
profit-maximizing platform sets tPP , whereas with a frictionless platform we have tFP = 0.
In practice P2P platform fees are posted online and are rarely changed, for example Amazon,
EBay, and Etsy.11 Then, as in the benchmark scenario, the supplier sets wPS1n , the retailer
purchases qPR1n units (corresponding to a price p
PR
1n ), and the consumers purchase based on
their expected utility. At the end of period 1, all consumers with mismatched products
((1−θ)qPR1n in expectation) wait to sell their products through the P2P market in the second
period. In period 2, as a new set of consumers shows up, the supplier sets wPS2n ,
12 and
the retailer purchases qPR2n units. Meanwhile q
PP
2p = (1 − θ)qPR1n used products are offered
through the platform. Used products traded through the P2P market are devalued by a
factor δ ∈ [0, 1]. That is, the expected benefit of these products by consumers in the
second period is θδv. Since used products on the P2P platform are sold to clear the market,
the corresponding prices of new and mismatched products, pPR2n and p
PP
2p , are determined
simultaneously. Note, although we use P for the first superscript, the logic holds for F .
11We also explored other fee structures for the platform. An analysis with zero transaction fee, representing
a frictionless secondary market, is discussed later in Section 6.1 of this paper. Percentage transaction fee,
which is adopted by a number of P2P platforms, is studied in the Online Supplement that accompanies this
manuscript. The results suggest that the insights do not change as one adopts a percentage rather than a
fixed fee. This observation is consistent with that of Chen et al. (2013) who state that with a percentage fee
“the results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to those from our baseline specification” where
they use a fixed transaction fee. In their model the transaction fee is merely a friction cost as they assume
away the platform.
12We find that wPS∗2n ≤ wPS∗1n in the platform scenario, Section 4.2. Accordingly retailers have no incentive
to hold inventory. Therefore, we abstract away from the issue of strategic inventories (see, e.g., Anand et al.
(2008), Hartwig et al. (2015)).
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4 Model Analysis
Next, we solve using backward induction for each of the scenarios described earlier. We
start with the benchmark scenario (Section 4.1), and then proceed to the platform scenarios
(Section 4.2).
4.1 Benchmark scenario: No P2P platform
In this section, we explore the supply chain partners’ equilibrium decisions and resulting
profit in the benchmark scenario. In period 1, the expected utility from buying a product
is the consumer’s expected valuation of the product minus its selling price, that is, UB1n =
θv − pBR1n . The consumer, indifferent between buying and not buying a product in period 1,
has a valuation of v̄B1 ≡ pBR1n /θ. Then the quantity of products sold in period 1 is given by
qBR1n = 1 − v̄B1 = 1 − pBR1n /θ, which follows from the assumption that consumers’ valuations
are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Similarly, in period 2, we have qBR2n = 1− pBR2n /θ.
Having derived the demand functions, we can express the supplier’s and the retailer’s
profit functions. In period 2, the profit of the retailer is given by ΠBR2 = (p
BR
2n −wBS2n )qBR2n =
(θ(1 − qBR2n ) − wBS2n )qBR2n , which is concave in qBR2n . Maximizing ΠBR2 with respect to qBR2n ,
we find that qBR∗2n = (θ − wBS2n )/2θ > 0, pBR∗2n = (θ + wBS2n )/2, ΠBR∗2 = (θ − wBS2n )2/4θ > 0.
Next, maximizing ΠBS2 with respect to w
BS
2n leads to w
BS∗
2n = (θ + c)/2, and consequently
ΠBS∗2 = (θ− c)2/8θ > 0. In this benchmark setting, the two periods are independent of each
other, hence all equilibrium decisions and profits in period 1 are as in period 2.
In summary, we find that qBR∗1n = q
BR∗
2n = (θ − c)/4θ, pBR∗1n = pBR∗2n = (3θ + c)/4,
wBS∗1n = w
BS∗
2n = (θ + c)/2, Π
BR∗ = (θ − c)2/8θ, and ΠBS∗ = (θ − c)2/4θ. Recall that
we assume c < θ, which guarantees strictly positive quantities. The profits of the supplier
and the retailer are decreasing in c, and increasing in θ. That is, higher unit cost and more
consumers uncertainty regarding their valuation will harm the supply chain partners’ profits.
In this benchmark scenario, there is no channel for consumers to trade their mismatched
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products; hence they receive negative utility when a product mismatch occurs. In the next
subsection we explore if a P2P platform can remedy the mismatch issue.
4.2 A P2P platform scenario
In the presence of a platform, a consumer has the option of selling the product in the second
period at the market clearing price, pPP2p , while paying a fee t
PP to the platform for using
this service. Thus, in period 1, the expected utility from buying a product is a consumer’s
expected valuation of a product minus its selling price, plus his expected payoff from selling




+ (1− θ)(pPP2p − tPP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected payoff
.
A consumer is indifferent between buying and not buying a product in period 1 when his
valuation of the product is v̄P1 = (p
PR
1n − (1 − θ)(pPP2p − tPP ))/θ, implying qPR1n = 1 − v̄P1 . In
period 2, the expected utility from buying a new product is UP2n = θv − pPR2n , whereas the
expected utility of buying a used product from the platform is UP2p = θδv−pPP2p . A consumer
is indifferent between buying a new product and a used product in period 2 if his valuation
of the used P2P product is v̄P2p = (p
PR
2n − pPP2p )/(1− δ)θ, implying qPR2n = 1− v̄P2p. A consumer
is indifferent between buying and not buying a used product from the platform when his
valuation of the used product is v̄Pp = p
PP




2p− v̄Pp . Having derived the
demand functions, we solve the Stackelberg game via backward induction.
Let c1 ≡ θ− θ(1−θ)(δ
2(1−θ)2(96−40δ)+128δ)
128−(1−θ)((1−θ)((1−θ)δ2(36−11δ)+56δ2−144δ)+16δθ) , c2 ≡ θ−
8θδ2(1−θ)2
64−(1−θ)(19(1−θ)δ2+64θδ−56δ) ≤
θ. We have the following Lemma. All proofs are provided in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, the profit-maximizing platform sets the transaction fee, tPP ,
depending on three different segments as follows:
Segment 1: if the unit cost of acquiring the products is sufficiently low, c ≤ c1, then the
platform transaction fee is equal to the used product’s selling price (tPP∗ = pPP2p ) to extract
all benefits from its consumers;
Segment 2: if c1 < c ≤ c2, then the transaction fee is lower than the used product’s selling
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price (tPP∗ < pPP2p ) to induce more consumers to purchase in the first period;
Segment 3: if the unit cost of acquiring the products is sufficiently high, c > c2, then the
platform sets the transaction fee to price the supply chain partners out of the second period
(i.e., qPR∗2n = 0).
Lemma 1 is formally restated in Appendix A. The optimal transaction fee and supply
chain partners’ corresponding decisions are demonstrated in Figure 2. From the platform’s
perspective, his profit is affected by the transaction fee and the demand of new products
in the first period, which in turn, determines the number of used goods available in the
second period. Therefore, the platform is trading-off between setting a high transaction fee,
referred to as the transaction fee effect, and having high first period demand, referred to as
the demand effect, because a higher transaction fee decreases the demand, and vice verse.
Therefore, the optimal transaction fee is a result of the interaction between the transaction
fee effect and the demand effect.
Lemma 1 shows that when the product’s unit cost is sufficiently low, the platform can
set the transaction fee as high as possible, equal to the selling price of the used goods.
In other words, the transaction fee effect dominates the demand effect, and the platform
has the power to extract the entire surplus from consumers who use its service. As the
unit cost increases, the transaction fee effect decreases while the demand effect increases,
as seen in Segment 2 in Figure 2, in which case the platform’s power is weakened. In
order to stimulate first period demand, the platform must reduce its transaction fee so as
to compensate consumers that may experience a mismatched product. As the unit cost
continues to increase, the platform will induce the supply chain partners to abandon their
business in the second period (Segment 3). Therefore, the mismatched goods on the platform
are the only goods sold in the market during the second period. The platform may extract
more of the surplus of the consumers using the platform to sell their mismatched goods,
but not enough to extract the entire surplus because the threat of the retailer selling new
goods in the second period. The existence of Segments 2 and 3 is important. They reveal
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that the platform has the incentive to leave money on the table by charging the users of
the marketplace a fee that is strictly less than the market clearing price. This result is by
contrast to the assumption made by Mantin et al. (2014) who assumed the the platform will
extract all surplus from the platform sellers.
 
   
          
               
                    
Segment 1 Segment 3 Segment 2 
Figure 2: Transaction fee and used goods’ price, θ = 0.2, δ = 0.9 [Note: θ is intentionally
chosen to a low value to emphasize Segment 3. This segment always exist since c2 ≤ θ.]
5 The impact of a profit-maximizing P2P platform
In this section we investigate the net effect of a profit-maximizing P2P platform on supply
chain partners and consumers. Comparing the profits of the supply chain partners between
the benchmark and platform scenarios, we find that the supply chain partners can be better
off with a high unit cost and worse off otherwise. This is formally stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. The introduction of a P2P platform
(1) reduces the total expected profit of supply chain partners when the unit cost is suffi-
ciently low, i.e., c < c̃sc ∈ [c1, c2];
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(2) increases the total expected profit of supply chain partners when the unit cost is suf-
ficiently high, i.e., c ≥ c̃sc,
where c̃sc is the threshold value that solves Π
BS + ΠBR = ΠPS + ΠPR.
 
         supply chain is worse off             no business          
         supply chain is better off   
 
   
   
 ̃   
  
Figure 3: Unit cost thresholds for supply chain, δ = 0.9
The threshold c̃sc in Theorem 1 and its corresponding regions are depicted in Figure 3.
From the supply chain partners’ perspective, the emergence of a P2P platform induces
several effects. In the second period of the platform scenario relative to the second period of
the benchmark scenario, the platform exposes the supply chain partners to competition from
used products, which results in lower wholesale prices, selling prices, as well as lower demand
for new products than those in the benchmark, and hence lower profit in the second period.
At the same time, because the platform mitigates some of the mismatch risk, the supply
chain partners can increase the prices of new products in the first period. However, higher
selling price also has a negative effect on the first period demand. As the unit cost increases,
c ≥ c1, the platform lowers the transaction fee to increase consumers’ expected payoff to






Segment 1 Segment 3 Segment 2 
̃    
Figure 4: Comparisons of supply chain partners’ total profits between Benchmark and Plat-
form scenarios, θ = 0.2, δ = 0.9
the negative effect of higher prices, it results in greater first period profit compared to the
benchmark scenario. As the unit cost increases, the gain in the first period stemming the
presence of the platform eventually exceeds the loss in the second period from the platform
competition, which leads to a net positive effect of the platform (once c > c̃sc, in segment 2
in Figure 4). In other words, the advantage of a P2P platform is that it increases the price
of new products and may stimulate first period demand, but the disadvantage is that the
competition impairs the supply chain partners’ profit. Only when the unit cost is sufficiently
high, will the benefit compensate the potential harm of having a platform, making the supply
chain partners better off.
While generally both supply chain partners are either better off or worse off with the
introduction of a platform, there exists a relatively small range of c values where the retailer
is better off while the supplier is worse off (see Proposition A.1 in Appendix A of the Online
Supplement).
The results above indicate that the effect of a platform on the supply chain partners
depends on the value of product’s unit cost. We now consider the platform’s impact on
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consumer surplus, which is the cumulative integration of consumers’ net utility over valuation
in two periods (see Proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A for formal statement). That is, the
monetary gain obtained by consumers for purchasing a product at a price less than the
highest price that they would be willing to pay.
Theorem 2. The introduction of a profit-maximizing P2P platform makes consumers worse
off when the probability of consumers having full private valuation and the products’ unit cost
are both sufficiently low, i.e., θ ≤ θ̃(δ) and c ≤ c̃cs(δ, θ). Otherwise, consumers are better off
in the presence of a platform, i.e., θ > θ̃(δ) or θ ≤ θ̃(δ) and c > c̃cs(δ, θ).
 
CS   
SW   if    ̃  ;   otherwise  
 
 ̃  
CS   
SW   
 
 ̃  
CS   if    ̃  ;   otherwise 
SW   if    ̃  ;   otherwise 
Figure 5: Effect of introduction of a profit-maximizing P2P platform on consumer surplus
and social welfare
This is an important insight. The perceived knowledge is that a P2P platform always
benefits consumers as it offers a channel to trade used goods and provides downward pressure
on the existing supply chain partners to lower prices. We find that this is generally true but
not universally, as a platform allows consumers to recover some of the loss from a mismatched
product and benefit from a more diverse second period market as well. Although the higher
first period price erodes these gains, it is not enough to make consumers worse off, unless
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consumers are extremely uncertain about the products’ valuation and the unit cost is also
very low. In that case, a profit-maximizing platform can be detrimental to consumers’ welfare
(see Figure 5).
Lastly, we consider the net effect of a profit-maximizing platform on social welfare, which
is the aggregated welfare of all agents, i.e., SWB ≡ ΠBS+ΠBR+CSB, SW P ≡ ΠPP +ΠPS+
ΠPR + CSP . Trivially, when product’s unit cost is high, a platform is welfare-imposing, as
the supply chain partners and consumers are better off and the platform makes positive
profit. However, the two previous results reveal the erosion of the supply chain partners’
and possibly the consumers’ welfare in the presence of a platform when θ and c are both
sufficiently low. Below we explore if a profit-maximizing platform creates welfare in the
system, or simply gravitates welfare away from the existing agents, the supplier, retailer and
consumers. We have the following insight.
Theorem 3. The introduction of a profit-maximizing P2P platform makes total social welfare
worse off when the probability of consumers having full private valuation and the products’
unit cost are both sufficiently low, i.e., θ ≤ θ̃′(δ) and c ≤ c̃sw(δ, θ). Otherwise, social welfare
is better off in the presence of a platform, i.e., θ > θ̃′(δ) or θ ≤ θ̃′(δ) and c > c̃sw(δ, θ).
This theorem indicates that a P2P platform is not always beneficial to society as shown
in Figure 5. Specifically, when consumers are not certain about the product’s valuation and
the unit cost is sufficiently low, the emergence of a P2P platform has a detrimental effect on
social welfare.
6 Model Extensions
In this section we consider two extensions to the model presented so far. We first consider
a frictionless P2P platform, one in which the platform does not charge any transaction fee.
We then consider the impact of strategic consumers.13
13In the Online Supplement that accompanies this manuscript we discuss the implication of switching from
an additive transaction fee to a multiplicative transaction fee.
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6.1 A frictionless P2P platform
We have shown that a profit-maximizing platform can critically affect supply chain partners’
optimal decisions and profits. However, in practice we also observe a variety of frictionless
platforms, such as Kijiji, Craigslist and autoTRADER, which allow their customers to trade
through the platform generally for free but each profits from other sources, like advertise-
ments and etc. In this section, we explore how a frictionless platform affects the supply chain
partners and consumers as compared to the two scenarios studied earlier: the benchmark
and in the presence of a profit-maximizing platform.
From modeling perspective, when the platform is frictionless, the only difference from
the profit-maximizing platform setting studied earlier is that the platform commits to a zero
transaction fee, that is, tPP , which is tFP in the current setting, is 0. Using backward induc-
tion, we derive the equilibrium decisions and corresponding profits. Similar to Lemma 1, we
have the following result.
Lemma 2. In the presence of a frictionless platform, in equilibrium, there exists a threshold
unit cost, cf ≡ θ− 8θδ
2(1−θ)2
32−δ(1−θ)(7δ(1−θ)−8(3−4θ)) , such that, when c > cf , the supply chain partners
are priced out of the second period (i.e. qFR∗2n = 0). Additionally, cf < c2, which implies
that the range of unit cost values for which they are priced out is larger with a frictionless
platform compared to a profit-maximizing one.
Lemma 2 is very insightful and its intuition is as follows: When the platform charges
no fee from its users, more mismatched goods are traded through the platform, thereby
increasing the range of unit cost values under which the supply chain partners are priced
out of the market in the second period. This raises a compelling question: as this occurs,
are the supplier and retailer better off in the presence of a frictionless market? Importantly,
no transaction fee stimulates the first period demand and further leads to greater supply of
used goods in the second period. Consequently, we have the following statement.
Theorem 4. A frictionless P2P platform,
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(1)generally makes the supply chain partners better off and always makes consumers better
off, as compared to the benchmark scenario. Specifically, the supply chain partners are worse
off when the probability of consumers having full private valuation and the products’ unit cost
are both sufficiently low, i.e., θ ≤ θ̂(δ) and c ≤ ĉsc(δ, θ). Otherwise, they are better off in the
presence of a frictionless platform, i.e., θ > θ̂(δ) or θ ≤ θ̂(δ) and c > ĉsc(δ, θ).
(2)always makes the supplier better off, and the retailer and consumers never worse off, as
compared to a profit-maximizing platform scenario. Specifically, the retailer and consumers
are better off when c < c2 and no worse off otherwise.
14
The introduction of a platform relieves consumers from some of their mismatch risk
and exposes the supply chain partners to competition in the second period. A frictionless
platform further stimulates competition in the second period, but the fact that it doesn’t
charge any transaction fee and induces greater demand in the first period, which more
than compensates the supply chain partners for the lost, or reduced, opportunity in the
second period. Similarly, consumers are also better off as the reduction of risk more than
compensates for the higher price charged in the first period.
To conclude, a frictionless platform improves the profit of both supply chain partners
as well as consumer welfare as compared to the benchmark scenario. Similar improvements
are observed when compared to the presence of a profit-maximizing platform. Importantly,
even when the supplier and the retailer are priced out of the second period, they can still be
better off. These are important insights that suggest that supply chain partners could, and
should, be engaged in facilitating such frictionless platforms for their consumers to trade
mismatched goods.
14Although we do not provide visual illustration of Theorem 4 qualitatively, θ̂ behaves very similarly as θ̃
in Figure 5.
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6.2 Strategic Waiting by Consumers
Thus far we have assumed that consumers are forward-looking in that they take future payoff
into consideration. Another aspect of forward-looking behavior is strategic waiting. There is
a significant body of literature that addresses pricing and inventory decisions in the presence
of strategic consumers (see, e.g., reviews by Aviv et al. (2009) and Chen and Chen (2015)).
In this section, we explore the effect of consumers’ strategic waiting as a P2P platform is
introduced. A key simplifying assumption when considering strategic consumers is that the
retailer commits to a pricing strategy before the first period starts. In particular, we assume
that exact prices are unknown, but consumers know if the second period price will be lower
or higher than the first. Knowing this relative price commitment a priori, either eliminates
(second period price higher) or induces (second period price lower) strategic waiting.
Let us consider first the benchmark case (i.e., no P2P platform). To capture consumers’
strategic waiting, in this case, we assume that in the first period, consumers choose between
buying the new good right away or defer and purchase a new good in the second period.
When they wait, they incur utility loss from not using the product in the first period,
captured by a factor γ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, in the first period, consumers compare the expected
utility from buying right now, θv−p1n, with the expected utility from waiting, γ(θv−p2n).15
We have the following intuitive result (which is provided without a proof):
Proposition 6.1. In the absence of a P2P platform, the retailer commits to a decreasing
prices trajectory. That is, the retailer encourages strategic waiting.
The intuition is rather simple: by encountering strategic consumers again in the sec-
ond period, the retailer is rewarded with a second opportunity to sell the goods to these
consumers. This allows the retailer to price-discriminate between consumers. Traditional
inter-temporal models generally suggest that in the presence of strategic consumers the re-
tailer is better off by (credibly) committing to a fixed price (to eliminate the inter-temporal
15In practice, some consumers may wait to purchase a used good in the second period. We assume that
such behavior is very limited as it relies on other consumers experiencing a mismatch and hence can be
ignored.
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competition)–the discussion on this aspect dates back to the seminal paper by Coase (1972).
However, in our setting, since there is a new cohort of consumers who arrive in the sec-
ond period, they serve as a counter balance against dropping the price too severely in the
second period and allow the retailer to take advantage of the segmentation offered via the
inter-temporal price discrimination.
We now turn our attention to the effect induced by the P2P platform. To capture
consumers’ strategic waiting, in this case, we assume that in the first period, consumers
choose between buying the new good right away, and having the chance of selling it on
the platform, or defer and purchase a new good in the second period. Similar to the earlier
scenario, the loss from not using the product in the first period is models via γ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus,
in the first period, consumers compare the expected utility from buying right now with the
chance of returning, θv+(1−θ)(p2p− t)−p1n, with the expected utility from waiting, γ(θv−
p2n). Recall from our analysis in Section 5 that in the absence of strategic waiting the retailer
benefits from the emergence of a P2P platform when the product’s unit cost is sufficiently
high (as a function of other model’s parameters). With consumers’ strategic waiting two
natural questions arise: 1. Can the retailer be better off when consumes strategically wait?
2. Does the presence of a platform still benefit the retailer? Our observations below, derived
based on numerical simulations, address the two questions above.
Observation 1. The retailer encourages strategic waiting when either θ or c are sufficiently
high.
Figure 6a reveals the platform’s competitive pressure on the retailer in the second period
hurts the retailer’s capacity to exercise inter-temporal price segmentation between consumers.
However, we still find a wide range of parameters’ values where the retailer encourages strate-
gic waiting, thereby making the retailer better off. In particular, with a high θ, consumers
are less likely to experience a mismatch and trade their goods through the platform, implying
a limited competitive threat from the platform. Hence, with a high θ, the retailer still prefers
to practice inter-temporal price segmentation. When c is high, a similar argument emerges:
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the selling price of the good is high, limiting the market for used goods in the second period,
again, allowing the retailer to benefit from inter-temporal price segmentation.
Observation 2. The emergence of a P2P platform, benefits the retailer when either θ is
sufficiently low or c is sufficiently high.
This observation is demonstrated in Figure 6b. Importantly, the range of parameters
values under which the retailer is better off due to a P2P platforms seems to be extended
to include a wider range of θ values, as compared to the case where consumers do not
exhibit strategic waiting. When c is sufficiently high, the same intuition applies as when
consumers do not exhibit strategic waiting. With a low θ the retailer also benefits from the
platform as it provides consumers with a channel to trade their mismatched goods with the
added advantage of inter-temporal pricing segmentation. Namely, the platform allows the
retailer to improve the segmentation of the consumers who arrive in the first period as now
the consumers have the opportunity to trade goods in the latter period, and this benefit
outweighs the competition imposed by the platform goods since the overall amount of goods
traded is relatively low.






























(a) Pricing commitment facing a P2P
























(b) Effect of P2P on the retailer
Figure 6: The effect of consumers’ strategic waiting on the retailer, γ = 0.5, δ = 0.5
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7 Conclusion
The development of P2P platforms has changed traditional retailing. Our paper fills a gap
in the literature by incorporating a P2P platform as a decision maker, setting its own profit
maximizing transaction fee, and while accounting for consumers’ valuation uncertainty about
goods. We show in this paper that when consumers’ valuation uncertainty is present, a P2P
platform can mitigate some of the risk by allowing consumers to trade their used goods,
however, at the same time, used goods on the platform also compete with new goods from
supply chain partners. Specifically, our model shows that when a product’s unit cost is
low, a P2P platform sets the transaction fee equal to the market-clearing price. Thus, the
platform extracts all surplus from consumers who sells their unwanted goods, while inducing
the retailer to increase prices of the goods in the first period. Consequently, a P2P platform
makes both consumers and supply chain partners worse off relative to when it is not present
by setting the transaction fee equal to the market-clearing price. However, as a product’s unit
cost increases, the platform no longer sets the transaction fee to equal the market-clearing
price, as a result the presence of the platform initially makes consumers better off, and as
the unit cost increases further, makes both consumers and supply chain partners better off.
The intuition is simple. From consumers’ perspective, a P2P platform brings the following
trade-off: increased price of new products vs. allowing consumer to sell unwanted goods
while consumers enjoy buying at a lower price in the second period. From supply chain
perspective the trade-off is between higher prices and possibly increased demand in the first
period demand vs eroded second period profits. Only when the unit cost is sufficiently high,
the benefit compensates the potential harm of facing a platform, making the supply chain
partners better off. In terms of consumer surplus and social welfare, a P2P platform can be
detrimental when both the probability of consumers having full private valuation and the
product’s unit cost are sufficiently low. Additionally, a frictionless P2P platform generally
makes the supply chain partners better off and always makes consumers better off compared
to the benchmark scenario, when it is not present, and it makes all agents never worse off
28
compared to the profit-maximizing platform scenario.
The results in this paper are based on a monopolistic model. In practice, there could
be multiple suppliers and retailers offering identical or similar products and various P2P
platforms can co-exist. Accordingly, fiercer competition may arise along more complicated
interactions among market agents. A possible extension of the present model is to consider
two or more supply chain channels and platforms. For instance, considering the competition
between Microsoft and Sony in the video-game industry, or Staples and Office Depot, it
could be better presented by a duopolistic or oligopolistic setting. However, we believe our
core insights still apply in such setting, and our work is a necessary fist step in analyzing
these, more complex, settings.
One may also consider the supply chain partners applying platform-mitigation strategies
in order to improve their profit, such as buying out the platform, offering refunds, limiting
the information released about products in order to increase consumer valuation uncertainty
(similar to Chu and Zhang, 2011), revenue-sharing with the platform and so on. If any
strategy is effective in increasing supply chain partners’ profitability is an open question and
needs to be explored further. For example, as shown in this paper, the platform can mitigate
some of consumers’ valuation uncertainty, but also impose competition. If the supply chain
partners buy out the platform and operate it by themselves possibly at no charge to users,
it might not be subgame: in the second period the incentive is to shut down the platform
to eliminate competition; however, they also might go the other way by stimulating the first
period demand to earn more transaction fees. Either way, it may help them eliminate the
threat of a P2P platform and boost their profits. Another modeling opportunity emerges
from trading sites that pay consumers upfront for their unwanted goods. In such a channel
the platform owns the goods sold and is responsible for reselling them in the second period.
This may result with a secondary market that does not clear the market.
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8(δ(1−θ)2(5δ−12)−16) if c ≤ c1;
δ(1−θ)(3θ+5c)+8(θ−c)
16(1−θ) if c1 < c ≤ c2;
δ2(1−θ)2(15θ−7c)+8(θ−c)(7δθ−4δθ2−3δ−4)
8δ(1−θ)2 if c > c2.
The corresponding supply chain’s decisions are given by:






} if c ≤ c2;
{ δ(1−θ)((1−θ)(5δθ+8c−4θ−δc−4t
PP∗)+4θ2)−8(θ−c)
4δ(1−θ) , θ(1− δ(1− θ)q
PR∗
1n )} if c > c2,
where A = δ(1− θ)((1− θ)(8(7δ− 16)tPP∗ − 11δ2c− 56δθ2 − 45δ2θ) + 128(θ+ c)− 8δ(7θ2 +
3c+ 2θc)) + 16(δc+ 7δθ − 8tPP∗).






} if c ≤ c2;
{ θ−c
δθ(1−θ) , 0} if c > c2.
The proof of Lemma 1 follows from backwards induction on the equilibrium decisions
of the supply chain partners and the platform. We characterize the subgame perfect Nash
equilibria for each game in our setting. Due to non-negativity constraints on production
quantities, the transaction fee being at most the market-clearing price, and the wholesale
price is at most the retail price, we have a large set of cases to consider in the analysis. The
complete analysis may be found in the on-line supplement of this manuscript.
Proof of Theorem 1. Denote ∆sc as the difference of the entire supply chain’s profits between
the benchmark scenario and the profit-maximizing platform scenario, that is, ∆sc = Π
BS∗ +
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ΠBR∗ − ΠPS∗ − ΠPR∗. We then consider ∆sc in each of the segments defined earlier in
Lemma 1.




≥ 0. Also, when d∆sc/dc = 0, minimum
∆sc = 0 is achieved at c = θ ≥ c1. So ∆sc is convexly decreasing when c ≤ c1 and
∆sc |c=c1> 0 for all 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.




≥ 0. Also when ∆sc = 0, c = c̃sc or c̃′sc,
where c1 < c̃sc ≤ c2 and c̃′sc ≥ θ. Therefore, c̃′sc is infeasible because of violation of individual
rationality, c < θ. Hence, if c ≤ c̃sc, ∆sc ≥ 0; otherwise, ∆sc < 0.
When c > c2, ∆sc is concave in c since
d∆2sc
d2c
≤ 0. Also, when d∆sc/dc = 0, maximum
∆sc = 0 is achieved at c = θ ≥ c2. So ∆sc is concavely increasing when c > c2 and
∆sc |c=c2< 0 for any 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. Denote ∆cs as the difference of consumer surplus between the bench-
mark scenario and the profit-maximizing platform scenario, that is, ∆cs = CS


















then consider ∆cs in each of the segments defined earlier in Lemma 1.




= 0 reveals a threshold value, θ̃, such that when θ ≥ θ̃,
∆cs is concave in c since
d∆2cs
d2c
≤ 0. Also, when d∆cs/dc = 0, maximum ∆cs is achieved at
c = θ ≥ c1. So ∆cs is concavely increasing when c < c1, θ ≥ θ̃, and ∆cs |c=c1< 0 for all
0 ≤ θ ≤ θ̃.




≥ 0. Also when d∆cs/dc = 0, the global
minimum ∆cs < 0 is achieved at c
′ ∈ [c1, c2]. Solving ∆cs = 0 reveals two threshold values,
c̃cs and c̃
′
cs, where c̃cs ≤ c1 if θ ≥ θ̃, c̃cs > c1 otherwise; and c̃′cs ≥ c2.
When c > c2, ∆cs is concave in c since
d∆2cs
d2c
≤ 0. Also, when d∆/dw = 0, maximum
∆cs = 0 is achieved at c = θ ≥ c2. So ∆cs is concavely increasing when c > c2 and ∆cs |c=θ= 0
for any 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
Proof of Theorem 3. Denote ∆sw as the difference of social welfare between the benchmark
scenario and the profit-maximizing platform scenario, that is, ∆sw = Π
BS∗+ ΠBR∗+CSB −
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(ΠPS∗+ ΠPR∗+CSP + ΠPP∗). We then consider ∆sw in each of the segments defined earlier
in Lemma 1.




≥ 0. Solving ∆sw |c=0= 0 for θ reveals
a threshold value, θ̃′, such that ∆sw |c=0≤ 0 if θ ≥ θ̃′, ∆sw |c=0> 0 otherwise. Solving
∆sw |c=c1= 0 for θ reveals another threshold value, θ̃′′, such that ∆sw |c=c1≤ 0 if θ ≥ θ̃′′,
∆sw |c=c1> 0 otherwise, where θ̃′ ≥ θ̃′′. Therefore, when θ < θ̃′, there exists a threshold
value of c, c̃sw ∈ [0, c1], making ∆sw = 0.




≥ 0. Solving ∆sw |c=c1= 0 for θ reveals a
threshold value, θ̃′′, such that ∆sw |c=c1≤ 0 if θ ≥ θ̃′′, ∆sw |c=c1> 0 otherwise, where θ̃′′ ≤ θ̃′.
Also ∆sw |c=c2≤ 0 for any 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Therefore, when θ < θ̃′′, there exists a
threshold value of c, c̃sw ∈ (c1, c2], making ∆sw = 0.
When c > c2, ∆sw is convex in c since
d∆2sw
d2c
≥ 0. ∆sw |c=c2≤ 0 for any 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1,
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Also, ∆sw |c=θ= 0 for any 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof follows the same steps as in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
The complete proof is provided in the Online Supplement.
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